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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF WILFRID SELLARS 
 
Summary 
According to Richard Rorty, Sellars’ philosophical enterprise has the merit of 
challenging the Kantian foundation of knowledge, since it aims at undermining 
the whole framework of givenness by adopting a form of holism founded on the 
idea that justification is not a matter of a special relation  between ideas and 
objects, but of conversation, of social practice. In this sense, philosophy cannot 
no way maintain the role of a metapractice intended to criticize all the possible 
forms of social interplays; it searches no more for  certainty. The behaviorist 
attitude is not a matter of “adequacy” since it aims at  rejecting all those sorts of 
explanations founded on the reliability and authority  of first-person reports about 
the world or the mind; more than this the issue of behaviorism is to inquire 
whether a practice of justification can be given a grounding in a fact. 
Sellars’ project can be seen as Kantian since he believes that the conceptual 
frameworks by virtue of which we encounter the world contain some synthetic a 
priori truths and are not deprived of a prescriptive or normative dimension. 
According to Sellars, to be a good philosopher is to cope with the dialectical 
character of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the 
current conceptual framework. The courage to threaten well-accepted frameworks 
is demonstrated by Sellars through the demolition of the myth of the Given, that is, 
through the rejection of the idea that there would be an exogenous Given imposed 
from the outside on our system of beliefs.  
Sellars’ efforts are directed toward the development of a sort of “principle of 
comprehension” according to which nothing in the phenomenal field must be 
completely repudiated since even the scientific discourse is but a continuation and 
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refinement of the common sense framework; in this sense, Sellars’ thought can be 
characterized as naturalistic even if not reductionist. 
 
1. Rorty reads Sellars 
According to Richard Rorty, philosophy since Descartes, has been dominated by 
epistemology; few philosophers took seriously the effort to stigmatize radically 
the notion of philosophy as metacriticism of special disciplines, proclaiming  the 
unreality of the traditional epistemological problems and solutions. 
“The spirit of playfulness” which connotes the philosophical enterprise at the 
beginning of the 1900, turned very early to a more serious way of doing 
philosophy, inspired by the force of the mathematical logic: Husserl and Russell 
are in this sense paradigmatic figures. 
The discovery of “privileged representations”- called by Russell “logical forms” 
and by Husserl “essences”-  can be seen as the last effort to rescue from the 
ancient philosophy the quest for seriousness, purity and rigor.  
The Kantian picture of concepts and intuitions getting together to produce 
knowledge was not only rescued but also was used as the means to distinguish 
philosophy from psychology: philosophy, in this sense, stays to empirical science 
as the study of structure to the study of content. 
Rorty’s attempt in his famous work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature45 is to 
challenge this Kantian foundation reminding us of Sellars’s behavioristic critique 
of the whole framework of the givenness and Quine’s behavioristic approach to 
the necessary-contingent distinction. 
Quine’s and Sellars’ way of thinking can be considered as a form of holism in that 
knowledge cannot be conceived of as an accurate representing- as the Mirror of 
Nature-, since such accuracy requires a theory of privileged representations which 
are automatically and intrinsically accurate. 
Their holism would depend on the thesis that justification is not a matter of a 
special relation between ideas and objects, but of conversation, of social practice: 
 
Conversational justification, so to speak, is naturally holistic, whereas the notion of justification 
embedded in the epistemological tradition is reductive and atomistic. … The crucial premise of 
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this argument is that we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of 
belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation.46 
 
Conversation then replaces confrontation and the idea of the mind as mirror of the 
Nature can be dispelled; philosophy, in this view, cannot have the role of a 
metapractice defined to exercise the critique of all possible forms of social 
practice: philosophy is no more a quest for certainty. 
 Notwithstanding  Sellars’ holism, his writing, according to Rorty, would be still 
permeated with the notion of analysis and with a tacit use of the distinction 
between the necessary and the contingent, the structural and the empirical; Sellars 
de facto is not as distrustful of these distinctions as Quine: while the latter 
believes that the notion of meaning would involve commitment to shady entities 
which, then, are worthy of being abandoned, the former retains that meanings per 
se may well be vague, even if meaning talk is classificatory. If classifications 
were not vague, then we could not find a logical space for linguistic tokens like 
“tall”, “short”, “fat” and so on. 
Willem DeVries argues this subject of matter as: 
 
Sellars thus sees no need to call the very idea of the analytic-synthetic or the a priori-a posteriori 
distinctions into question, although his position implies that these distinctions are not the sharp-
edged distinctions the logical positivists assumed they were.47  
 
Sellars, however, keeps the analytic-synthetic distinction separate from the a 
priori-a posteriori distinction, for the former distinction concerns formal truth, 
while the latter has to do with material truths; it is the notion of material truth 
which permits Sellars to define better his notion of the synthetic a priori: the good 
inferences in fact which are contained in the conceptual framework of an 
expression are not all the formal inferences:  if the material rule of inference by 
virtue of which “x is colored” can be validly inferred from “x is red”  is a good 
one, then the proposition “All red things are colored” can be seen as a synthetic a 
priori proposition. 
Sellars, notwithstanding his endorsement of synthetic a priori propositions, cannot 
be considered a Kantian, for there is no need to believe that, like in Kant, there is 
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a single synthetic a priori proposition that is an element of all possible languages 
or conceptual frameworks. 
De Vries gives further details on Sellars’ endorsement: 
 
In this respect, Sellars is more Hegelian than Kantian, for he recognizes that the synthetic a priori 
truths and even the set of categories we operate with are, potentially, dynamic, changing under the 
impact of both experience and reflection.48  
    
 
Rorty makes a point of the impossibility for analytic philosophy to be written 
without one or the other of these distinctions: for this reason, the analytic 
movement in the present stage, as an entrenched school of thought, would lack of 
metaphilosophical reflection and of methodological self-consciousness. 
Quine and Sellars raise behaviorist questions about the epistemic status of 
assertions warranted by privileged assertions: for Sellars one point of interest lies 
in the reason we have, if we have, to distinguish between the authority of first-
person reports and that of expert reports; the certainty of “I have a pain”  would 
be then  a reflection of the fact that nobody cares to question it, not conversely: 
 
Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society lets us say, rather than 
the latter by the former, is the essence of what I shall call ‘epistemological behaviorism’, an 
attitude common to Dewey and Wittgenstein.49  
 
If , however, we interpret epistemological behaviorism as a kind of holism 
according to which to understand the rules of language amounts to understand the 
way moves are made in that language50, we must accept the premise that 
epistemic notions must be explicated only in behavioral terms, that is to say, 
remarks like “S knows that” must be interpreted as remarks about the status of S’s 
reports among his peers and not as remarks mirroring the world. 
If this premise is well accepted, then philosophy comes down to a therapeutic tool 
for straightening out quarrels between common sense and philosophy and nothing 
else. 
According to this point of view, Sellars’ account of first-person contemporary 
reports is grounded on the following conviction: to say that this kind of reports are 
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incorrigible is to say that “nobody has yet suggested a good way of predicting and 
controlling human behavior which does not take sincere first-person 
contemporary reports of thoughts at face-value”. 
Behaviorist attitude is not only a matter of “adequacy”, but it claims simply that 
philosophy ought to offer common sense about knowledge and truth; it amounts to 
a rejection of a sort of explanation which tries to expound the reliability of reports 
about the world or the mind by using notions like “acquaintance with meanings” 
or “acquaintance with sensory data”. 
If we are legitimated to postulate such abstract entities as helpful tools for 
entrenching our causal explanations, we cannot interpret them as premises from 
which to infer our knowledge of other entities: 
 
What we cannot do is to take knowledge of these “inner” or “abstract” entities as premises from 
which our knowledge of other entities is normally inferred, and without which the latter 
knowledge would be “ungrounded”.51  
 
This is a move which is attempted for the first time by Wittgenstein who 
dethrones the myth according to which rationality would consist in a state of 
constraint under rules. The Austrian philosopher makes a great work by 
dissolving the traditional notion of analyticity, by replacing the traditional term 
“coherence”, intended as a kind of  “glue” which connects one element of the 
discourse with the other, with a colored linguistic context:  the idea of necessity, 
then is destined to disappear.  
Coherence, in the traditional debate, is conceived metaphorically  as the force of a 
rope which goes through and links the steps and the phases of thought and 
language; in Wittgenstein’s point of view however, the force of a rope would 
consist much more in the fibre interlacements: 
 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; 
for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, 
temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.—And I shall say: ‘games’ form a 
family. 
And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 
“number”? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have 
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hitherto been called number; and this may be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things 
that we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist 
fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one  fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. 
But if someone wished to say: “There is something common to all these constructions—namely 
the disjunction of all their common properties”—I should reply: Now you are only playing with 
words. One might as well say: “Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous 
overlapping of these fibres”.52  
 
The issue of behaviorism in epistemology is not the adequacy or the explanation 
of a fact, but , much more that of inquiring  whether a practice of justification can 
be given a grounding in a fact; this does not mean that knowledge is cut off from 
the world, but only that justification is a practice referred to what we already 
accept, so that we cannot  “get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find 
some test other than coherence”53. 
Sellars however cannot be defined a coherentist in the classical sense, since he 
does not maintain that all knowledge is inferential: perceptual and introspective 
reports, as a matter of fact, can be considered as instances of noninferential 
knowledge54; according to the American philosopher, both the foundationalist and 
the coherentist positions conceal a position similar to that of “the myth of the 
Given” and they do so in linking together the notions of noninferential and self-
justifying55. He tries, on the contrary, to keep these notions distinct, formulating a 
theory in which noninferential knowledge doesn’t amount to self-justifying 
knowledge. 
There is no a “permanent neutral matrix”  to regard some scientific or moral 
assumptions more rational than others; if we dispense with foundations or 
ontological grounds, then we implicitly admit that the only cultural criticism 
admitted is that which goes on piecemeal and partial without any referring to 
eternal standards.  
Sellars’ opposition to Platonism consists in his throwing back any attempt to 
measure the worth of every assertion and action by recurring to the notion of 
correspondence instead of that of coherence. 
Rorty, however , affirms that Sellars cannot get along without appealing to a 
residual form of Platonism: 
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Unfortunately, both men tend to substitute correspondence to physical entities, and specifically to 
the ‘basic entities’ of physical science (elementary particles, or their successors).56 
 
As to the residual form of Platonism present in Sellars, it can be said that the 
American philosopher does not belong to those radical nay-sayers which not only 
deny much of the metaphysical architecture, dismissing it as mere non-sense, but 
they also reject the metaphysical project itself. Sellars, on the contrary, aims at 
constructing a metaphysics in which you can find some truths which have not the 
form of evidences (as in Descartes), but that of complexes in which competing 
insights balance reciprocally in several different dimensions: 
 
Classical rationalism… made explicit the grammar of epistemological and metaphysical 
predicates, but- owing to certain confusions, particularly with respect to meaning and existence- 
came to the mistaken conclusion that philosophical statements were factual statements, albeit of a 
particular kind. Classical empiricism, on the other hand, argued that these statements were 
common or garden variety factual statements, and usually put them in the psychological species. 
Rationalism gave the grammar, but contaminated it with platonizing factualism. Classical 
empiricism threw out the platonizing, but continued to factualize, and confused the grammar of the 
philosophical predicates by attempting to identify them with psychological predicates….57 
 
The importance of Quine’s and Sellars’ enterprise would lie in their declining 
every attempt to reduce norms, rules, justifications to facts, generalizations and 
explanations; this strategy has a positive outcome insofar as they do not want to 
offer any account to be tested for adequacy: the idea, that is to say, of an account 
of human knowledge is futile. 
According to them, rationality of science is not due to the fact that it has a 
foundation (Sellars) or it has an architectonic structure (Quine): science is for the 
first a “self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not 
all at once”58 , while for the second it resembles a field of force in which there are 
no assertions immune from revision. 
Sellars’ project, in particular, can be seen as a Kantian response to the dominant 
empiricism of the XX century; the manifest and the scientific images are, as a 
matter of fact, transcendentally ideal frameworks because they are human 
constructs; to put it in other words, any conceptual framework determine some 
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synthetic a priori truths, including valid forms of material inference, even if there 
is no set of absolute truths. 
Every conceptual framework has necessarily a prescriptive or normative 
dimension: they are in  act constituted by valid inferences, formal and material, 
and by the responses and behaviors that are permitted by them. 
Science itself, contain methods which consist also of prescriptive claims; 
according to Sellars however, the prescriptive dimension of science is not 
complete, insofar scientists do not deal with questions, such as the legitimacy of 
some scientific investigations. 
In this sense, science, even if promoting our epistemic welfare, can contribute to 
the broader intersubjective intention to promote our welfare unconditionally59. 
Science thus can have practical relevance or reality, even if it is the manifest 
image that retains practical priority over the scientific: the scientific image raises 
in fact practical issues it is not in a position to answer: 
 
The practical reality of scientific objects, as such,  however, is extrinsic to them. Their practical 
reality is not intrinsic to them, for it is not, for instance, tied in to their identity and individuation 
conditions60. 
 
The most important point however in Sellars’ account of science is the claim that 
no theory of representation provides a good explanation of how science goes on: 
that is, no account of nature can rely on a theory of representations which stand in 
privileged relations to reality. 
To better appreciate this matter of fact, we need to reflect upon Sellars’ account of 
the nature of scientific laws. 
Sellars’ account of scientific laws can be seen as mediation and synthesis of what 
he considers as positive insights contained in the empiricist and the rationalist 
poles61: putting it in other words, the empiricist is right in claiming that the world 
contains only constant conjunctions of events (there is no place for causal power), 
but, on the other hand, the rationalist is right in claiming that the language of 
causal necessity is an irreducible element of rational discourse about the world, 
even if P-entailments have no descriptive significance. 
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Sellars’ account of the role of causal necessity is similar to that regarding the role 
of observation basis: they have both a methodological significance. 
The American philosopher then regards laws as material rules of inference, that 
is, as rules that permit us to move from statement X to statement Y where X and 
Y are nonlogical terms: a law like “water boils at 212o F” can be rendered by 
“from ‘x is water’ infer ‘x boils at 212o F’”. 
 Gary Gutting writes: 
 
The most immediate motivation for regarding laws as material rules of inference is to desire to 
implement the ideate that necessity of laws does not correspond to an ontological fact but rather to 
a methodological directive. If laws are rules of inference, then their direct function is to tell us 
what we ought to do, not what is the case. (This construal paves the way for Sellars’ own version 
of a pragmatic “vindication” of induction…).62 
 
This interpretation of the nature of scientific laws is tied intimately to Sellars’ 
theory of meaning and to his rejection of the epistemological given; Sellars, in 
particular, makes clear that there is no such thing as pre-linguistic awareness 
which would provide the special sort of certainty associated with the visual 
perception: 
 
All awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities- indeed, 
all awareness of particulars- is a linguistic affair.63  
 
Awareness intended as being in the logical space of reasons and not as a 
discriminative behavior is justified true belief: the ability then to respond to 
stimuli (discriminative behavior) is a causal condition for knowledge but not a 
ground for knowledge; moreover, the empiricist account of knowledge according 
to which concepts and particulars are temporally prior to any propositional 
knowledge is, on the basis of the above view, misguided.  
If, however, there is no such thing as a justified belief which is not propositional,  
how pre-linguistic children can be said to know i.e. what red is in a sense different 
from the color discrimination of, say, a photoelectric cell? 
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Sellars introduces to solve this problem the distinction between “knowing what X 
is like” and “knowing what sort of thing an X is” ; children see or, more general, 
feel the same thing (a red ball, e.g.) before and after language-learning: 
 
Before language, he is said to know the thing he feels just in case it is the sort of thing which in 
later life he will be able to make noninferential reports about.64 
 
Children are then different from photoelectric cells for they have this “latent 
ability”  which will be developed when they will grasp the relevant vocabulary, 
for, according to Sellars, to have a concept is to use a word and, more 
particularly, we cannot have a concept without having many. 
The distinctions made above supply the theoretical ground to overtake the 
obstacles created by the myth of the Given since, according to this myth, there is a 
connection, a grounding relation, between knowing what something is like and 
knowing that sort of thing something is. 
In Sellars’ point of view, language does not produce “inner” changes, but let us 
enter a community in which assertions can be justified and so legitimated :one 
thing is to explain the acquisition of language, another thing, very different from 
the former, is to understand the justification of human knowledge which rests on a 
social practice: 
 
Once again, Sellars falls back on saying that justification is a matter of social practice, and that 
everything which is not a matter of social practice is no help in understanding the justification of 
human knowledge, no matter how helpful it may be in understanding its acquisition .65 
 
Summarizing: the greater mistake made by the epistemological tradition was to 
confuse the causal process of acquiring knowledge with questions regarding its 
justification: in this perspective, Sellars’ commitment to philosophy is similar to 
Wittgenstein’s effort in the Investigations: it is, ultimately, the “natural corollary” 
of  the Tractatus’s separation between fact-stating  assertions and others uses of 
language (ethical, religious, aesthetical and so on). 
In other words, Sellars’ attempt is to turn outward what the philosophical tradition 
has turned inward , regarding knowledge as depending on social context rather 
than on relations between inner representations seen as the touchstone of truth. 
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2. Sellars’ theory of knowledge 
Before touching some issues about Sellars’ conception of  knowledge, it is worth 
giving briefly Sellars’ view of the role of philosophy among the disciplines of the 
intellect. Sellars tries, from the very beginning of his philosophical enterprise, to 
balance competing insights which constitute the epistemological domain: 
empiricism, rationalism, foundationalism, coherentism, externalism, internalism, 
realism, phenomenalism, idealism. 
In this sense, Sellars’ philosophical discourse can be seen as an attempt to  
maintain a central position with respect to all the above mentioned insights, 
preserving the best results or fruits of every position; we can, however, retain a 
central position only by acknowledging  the most important pair of opposing 
pitfalls: the coherentism  that rejects any rational external constraint and the myth 
of the Given which offers “exculpations” where what we need is “justifications”66. 
Only by stopping oscillation between these pitfalls, we may arrive at a 
consideration of empirical knowledge as a co-operation between sensibility and 
understanding; according to John McDowell, one way of disposing of these 
pitfalls would consist in assuming that understanding is already implicated in the 
deliverances of sensibility: 
 
Experiences are impressions made by the world on our senses, products of receptivity; but those 
impressions themselves already have conceptual content.67 
Sellars supports the above position by denying that there would be a basic level at 
which knowledge is a matter of an immediate encounter with its object, as if this 
immediate knowledge were not inferred from any other knowledge. 
According to the most American philosopher, to defend the notion of Given 
would mean to affirm that there is a difference between inferring that something 
is the case and seeing it to be the case;68 it is however remarkable to note that the 
word “Given” is intended by Sellars as a piece of professional-epistemological 
talk, which carries with it a substantial theoretical commitment. 
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At the core of sense-datum theories there is a distinction between an act of 
awareness and the object of this act: acts moreover are often characterized as 
“phenomenologically simple” that is to say, not further analyzable. 
Sense-datum theorists, in this point of view, argue that in perception we are not 
directly related to physical objects, but to sense data which, in some way, would 
mirror the ontological status of the real objects. 
The major point of Sellars’ view is the idea that numerous tensions are hidden in 
sense-datum theories that can be characterized in these terms: 
1) knowledge of facts versus knowledge of particulars; 
2) learned versus unlearned cognitive capacities; 
3) factualism about knowledge versus non-naturalism about knowledge; 
4) inner episodes as causal intermediaries of empirical knowledge versus 
inner episodes as epistemic intermediaries of empirical knowledge.  
Sellars fashions an account of sensation which construes this both instrumentally 
and nonepistemically: sensations are neither the direct objects of knowledge, nor 
are they primordial knowings; they would belong to the causal order rather than 
to the cognitive one . 
Sensations do mediate and guide our perceptual knowledge of the world, even if 
this knowledge is not a “second-class knowing” inferred from the knowledge of 
items like color and sounds: our knowledge of the world is direct but mediated. 
For this reason sensations cannot be considered like knowings: they are states of 
perceivers that are nonepistemic in character and depending on external causes; 
sensations are a necessary condition of the intentional order, even if they do not 
belong to this order. 
Sellars does not accept Ryle’s talk of “category mistake”, for he retains that not 
only inner episodes are not category mistakes, but they are quite “effable” in 
intersubjective discourse ; according to Sellars, as a matter of fact,  the concepts 
of sense impressions must be: 
 
Primarily and essentially inter-subjective, without being resolvable into overt behavioral 
symptoms, and that the reporting role of these concepts, their role in introspection, the fact that 
each of us has a privileged access to his impressions, constitutes a dimension of these concepts 
which is built on and presupposes their role in intersubjective discourse. It also makes clear why 
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the “privacy” of these episodes is not the “absolute privacy” of the traditional puzzles. For, as in 
the case of thoughts, the fact that overt behavior is evidence for these episodes is built into the very 
logic of these concepts.69  
 
Sellars, to some extent, warns against confusing the creative enrichment, made 
possible by the language of impressions,  of the framework of the empirical 
knowledge with an analysis of knowledge in itself: to put it in other words, the 
normative character of knowledge cannot be confused with the factual character 
of the same; in some sense, the language of impressions is an act of believing and 
deciding, a construing of data and the Given  in the sense of a taking imposition: 
 
He [Jones] construes as data the particulars and arrays of particulars which he has come to be able 
to observe, and believes them to be antecedent objects of knowledge which have somehow been in 
the framework from the beginning. It is in the very act of taking that he speaks of the given.70  
 
As argued by Robert Brandom, our concepts of things cannot depend on the fact 
that we have first observed them, for, in observing things, we must presuppose in 
some way the concept of these. 
To notice something amounts then, in epistemically terms, to answer to its 
presence by applying a concept in a non inferential judgment: I am aware of “red 
things” only if a possess the concept “red”; if we lack then the concept “red” we 
cannot observe or we cannot be aware of red things, even if we can respond 
discriminately to them. 
Unfortunately, according to Brandom, Sellars does not make clear explicitly his 
attitude toward empiricism and this would depend on the difficulty to establish if 
he is giving his thesis or he is laying out thesis of other scholars. 
Sellars, to some extent, shares the idea of the empiricists according to which the 
capacity of having classificatory beliefs of the form “x is F” is acquired, even if he 
does not accept the idea that the formation of concepts and the warranty of their 
non inferential application would depend on the existence of non verbal  and non 
conceptual inner episodes. 
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At this point of the analysis, therefore, it arises the question if we can break out of 
our creative language and discourse to an archè beyond language and discourse; if 
every given is an act of taking, that is, something tied to our activities and, more 
generally, to our subjectivity, it emerges the question if we can climb over the 
boundary constituted by our languages toward the comprehension of a given 
intended in its autonomy; we cannot thus assimilate sensations to the intentional 
order, even if we are allowed to state that, in some way, these states of the 
perceiver are related to the cognitive order. 
In Sellars’ opinion, we are tempted to see sensations as epistemic firstly because 
there is a grammatical similarity between the language of sensations (“a sensation 
of a green and round thing”) and the language we adopt to refer to and 
characterize items of the cognitive order (“a thought of a green and round thing”); 
secondly, from a logical point of view, “there is a sensation of a green and round 
thing” fails to entail “there is a green and round thing” just as “there is a thought 
of a pink elephant” fails to entail “there is a pink elephant”. 
It is also important to note that the use of analogy between sensations and 
physical things can be very dangerous: we can, for instance, introduce sensations 
of red triangles or sensations of green balls by analogy to red triangles and black 
blackboards, but we cannot make the same thing about sensations of pain or 
pleasure: these sensations, in fact, are not inner replicas of any physical objects. 
We  cannot neglect also the fact that the problem concerning sensations is tied, in 
Sellars, to how we can “define” a person: persons are individuals that have 
perceptible characteristics and behave in perceptible ways; the behavior concerns, 
first of all, the use of language intended as a “thinking-out-loud” and the 
meaningfulness of which is to be found in the coherence exhibits not only within 
it, but also in its relation to the contexts in which it occurs. 
However,  this “austere conception” of the person can be extended and, more 
particularly, enriched by introducing the notion of “sensing”: 
 
Thus sensings were introduced as theoretical states involved in the explanation, for example, of 
how it could seem to a person that there is a pink ice cube in front of him when in point of fact 
there is not. In both the veridical perception of a pink ice cube and a perceptual experience which 
would be veridical if  there were such a object in front of one, the person senses a-pink-cubely, or, 
in more familiar terms, has a sensation of a pink cube (where ‘of a pink cube’ is to be construed 
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depth-grammar-wise as an adjective) so that the expression might be parse ‘an of-a-pink-cube 
sensation’71. 
 
Persons, according to Sellars, are basic objects for which a value-free description 
is meaningless: they have a normativity which is natural and intrinsic; in the 
manifest image then, the practical reality of persons is foundational: whereas 
persons possess intrinsic values, objects have value only in relation  to persons; 
secondly, persons have states and behaviors which have value. 
It comes into being also the problem of matching this analysis of persons with the 
conception that science ought to be considered as the measure of what is that it is 
and what is not that it is not, for, from an empirical point of view, persons are 
dependent objects, complexes of objects posited by science. 
Persons, however, are not artifacts, even if they, together with their attendant 
properties (such as intentional states), bear some analogies with artifacts; beliefs 
or intentions, in Sellars’ theory of intentionality are functional states in that every 
attribution of intentionality to a human subject requires that the subject of the 
intentional state participates in a complete, intersubjective community; this 
functionality is all that counts to the concept of intentionality which is built on a 
background of rule-governed practices and institutions. 
This does not mean that persons and their intentions are demoted by Sellars to 
mere illusions, lacking of ontological reality; they, as a matter of fact, are 
phenomena available only to a particular  point of view: “The point of view of a 
self-conscious, rational, logic-using agent who is a member of a community that 
is, individually and collectively, engaged in pursuing various ends in a world it 
did not make”.72  
 
3. Perceiving as thinking 
Sellars regards knowledge as belonging in a normative context so that when we 
characterize an episode as that of knowing, we do not give an empirical 
description of that episode or state: we are placing it in the logical space of 
reasons where only justifications count. 
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If, as a matter of fact, the normative context in which knowledge is shaped is 
neglected, epistemology is liable to fall into a naturalistic fallacy as pointed out 
by John McDowell: 
 
Sellars separates concepts that are intelligible only in terms of how they serve to place things in the 
logical space of reasons, such as the concept of knowledge, from concepts that can be employed in 
‘empirical description’. And if we read the remark as a warning against a naturalistic fallacy, we 
are understanding “empirical description” as placing things in the logical space of nature, to coin a 
phrase that is Sellarsian at least in spirit73. 
 
Epistemology ought to avoid the impasses of representationalism and 
phenomenalism,  affirming that the objects of basic knowings are physical objects 
and that there is no more basic form of knowledge than perceiving physical 
objects. 
To investigate this matter further, we ought to be certain about the structure of 
perceptual experience; first of all, we must admit that perceiving essentially 
involves thinking: perceiving therefore presupposes a knowledge of general truths 
about material things. 
To comprehend this point better, we ought to admit that ontology cannot be 
severed from epistemology “as with a knife”:74 according to Sellars, as a matter of 
fact, attributions of objectual knowledge amount to attributions of generalized 
propositional knowledge and even of know-how knowledge: if “George knows 
Rome”, then “George knows how to get around in the city” where things are so 
and so. 
Knowledge of particulars thus cannot itself be the independent foundation of all 
propositional knowledge; propositional knowledge itself depends causally on the 
know-how we manifest in making material inferences: at this point we find 
Sellars’ pragmatist strain. 
Nevertheless, perceiving is not merely thinking: there is a descriptive core of 
seeing, e.g. a seen yellow square distinguishes itself from merely thinking about a 
yellow square; we have to sort out then a propositional component and a 
descriptive core.  
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In Sellars’ view however, perception is more than merely sensing and, for this 
reason, can be characterized as an awareness of a this-such; seeing something as 
yellow is a conceptual process which is the slow building up of a multi-
dimensional pattern of linguistic responses. 
Experience  is a matter of identifying individuals as instances of a kind and, for 
this reason, is literally a thinking involving a propositional component which 
cannot be reduced to a limited number of kind concepts, because it presupposes a 
whole battery of concepts.  
This way of interpreting our perceptual awareness of any fact corresponds to our 
understanding of the way thinking goes on: not in bit and pieces. 
What said above has much to do with Sellars’ conception of philosophy: to 
understand the way we think or perceive, we have to “stumble on the familiar” 
and to feel a “haunting sense of alienation”, trying to become reflectively at home 
in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of 
which we suffer, think, and act. We must begin by constructing simple models of 
fragments of this multidimensional patterns even if we cannot be never satisfied 
with them for the reason that they can be connected with other systems: 
 
And, indeed, the ultimate justification for system building in philosophy is the fact that no model 
for any region of discourse-perceptual, discursive, practical, can be ultimately satisfying unless its 
connection with each of the others is itself modeled.75  
 
To stress this idea amounts to reject a characteristic form of the Myth of the Given 
according to which there must be a structure of a  particular matter of fact such 
that: i) each fact can be non-inferentially known to be the case ii) and this 
noninferential knowledge would constitute the ultimate court of appeals for all 
factual claims. 
The idea of a privileged stratum  of fact rests on the familiar assumption that 
knowledge, at this level, ought to be noninferential, ultimate and provided with 
authority; this amounts to say that the statements concerning this level, must 
involve a kind of credibility without which they cannot rise to the dignity of 
knowledge. The kind of credibility which gets into  these statements would not 
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depend on the credibility of other statements: there seems to be a class of 
statements which fill some of these requirements, statements which report 
observations such as “This is green”. 
These statements are made as to “involve those so called token-reflexive 
expressions which, in addition to the tenses of verbs, serve to connect the 
circumstances in which a statement is made with its sense”.76 
Anyway, it seems that a sentence token, whether it contains a token-reflexive 
expression or not, can acquire credibility in two ways: 
(a) inherited from a type authority as in the case of tokens of a sentence type 
like ‘2+2=4’ ; 
(b) gained by the fact that credibility arouse in a certain set of circumstances  
as in sentences like “ This is green”.  
Since no empirical sentence type appears to have intrinsic credibility, this means 
that credibility must accrue to some empirical sentence types by virtue of their 
logical relations to certain sentence tokens the authority of which is not derived 
from the authority of sentence types: 
 
The picture we get is that of their being two ultimate modes of credibility: (1) The intrinsic 
credibility of analytic sentences, which accrues to tokens as being tokens of such a type; (2) the 
credibility of such tokens as ‘express observations’, a credibility which flows from tokens to 
type.77 
 
The second mode of credibility commits one to believe that the authority of the 
observation reports, also Konstatierungen, would rest on non verbal episodes of 
awareness which have an intrinsic authority: 
 
One is committed to a stratum of authoritative nonverbal episodes (‘awareness’), the authority of 
which accrues to a superstructure of verbal actions, provided that the expressions occurring in 
these actions are properly used .78 
 
To surmount the perplexities bound to the empiricist view, we must begin to 
assume, firstly, that a report can be correct “as being an instance of a general 
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mode of behavior  which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to 
sanction and to support”79; secondly, that the authority of a report must be 
recognized by the person whose report it is.  
According to this view then, to make an observation report expressed by a token 
like “This is yellow” does not amount to follow the uniform behavior of a 
thermometer. 
 
4. Sellars on reductionism 
The questions discussed hitherto make a point of another important issue treated 
by Sellars in an original way: how to approach reductionism. 
According to Sellars, a principle of object reduction can be stated in the following 
way: 
 
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property of the object must consist in 
the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in such and such relations or, 
roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of properties of, and relations between, its 
constituents.80  
 
This is clearly and explicitly a principle of object reduction for: if an object has a 
property that does not consist of properties of and relations between its 
constituents, then that thing cannot be reduced within that framework: a person, 
for example, is a complex object and has constituents, but it is irreducible because 
not all of its properties consist in facts about its constituents,  qualities and 
relations; a person is, in that framework, a basic object. 
The principle of reduction nevertheless cannot be applied to colors of physical 
objects in the Manifest Image for the assumption that the micro-physical particles 
constituting the object ought to be colored makes no sense. 
Being  Sellars’ principle of reduction grounded on the criterion of property 
reduction , it is reasonable to think that manifest physical objects cannot be 
reduced to systems of microphysical objects, since the former have proper 
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sensible properties that cannot be reduced to the properties of the systems of 
microparticles. 
Sellars distinguishes between an intra-theoretic property reduction and an inter-
theoretic property reduction; in the case of the chemical theory and the micro-
physical theory, he states that the current predicates and primitives of both 
theories are to be considered as predecessors of concepts in an encompassing 
theory in which there can be found an adequate definitional relation between the 
two different theoretical kind of predicates. 
What about raw feel predicates? 
It seems that any reduction must be dismissed, since raw feel predicates especially 
are untheoretical, but, according to Sellars, this is false for raw-feel predicates can 
be construed as theoretical: 
 
…if both raw-feel and brain-state predicates are theoretical predicates, can we not conceive of a 
reduction of raw-feel theory to brain-state theory? 81 
 
Raw-feel predicates can be also, according to Sellars, primitive predicates in a 
unified theory, because they remain non definable in this theory; but, to avoid 
misunderstanding, it is important to remark that undefined predicates are not for 
this reason meaningless, for their meaning depends on the role they play in 
language-entry, language-exit and intralinguistic transitions82. 
Returning to the question of reducibility, Sellars affirms that in a to be achieved 
sense-impression- brain-state theory, the logical space of sense-impressions shall 
be “transposed into a new key and located in a new context”83, avoiding every 
possibility of reduction. 
The non reductive alternative is preferable for Sellars, since he thinks that the set 
of primitives necessary to scientific explanation and description of non living-
objects are not adequate to describe and explain sentience organisms: a proper 
explanation of sentience organism may introduce new entities that are not called 
in the explanation of the behavior of non-sentient objects. 
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According to Sellars, proper sensible, i.e. colors, odors, must receive a special 
ontological treatment in an ultimately satisfactory scientific theory: this argument 
has been dubbed the “grain argument” which can be divided in two stages: 
1. Colors (odors and the like) cannot be really properties of physical objects 
per se; are then they modifications of mind? 
2. Proper sensibles cannot be reduced to modifications of brain qua system of 
micro-particles. 
 
As noticed by deVries this argument leaves us with a stark choice: 
 
…either the proper sensibles are (modifications of) immaterial or nonphysical things, or they are 
so totally illusory that nothing in the world explains them, or we have to provide for them in the 
scientific picture of the world, for example, recognize in the ultimate scientific image basic 
particulars to which the sensible predicates directly apply.84  
 
According to Richardson and Muhlenberg85 Sellars, in the long run, would not 
press for irreducibility; instead of it, he would appreciate an argument designed to 
accomodate sense impressions within a reductionist program. 
In doing so, Sellars would make use of successive approximations and revisions, 
starting e.g. from an Aristotelian conception of persons as single logical subjects 
to arrive at a final sophistication according to which persons are complexes 
standing in relations to other complexes: persons, in this last image, sense even if 
their sensings are reducible states.  
Even regarding Sellars as  a reductionist, it does not mean that he would 
acknowledge the truth of the following statement: manifest objects are identical 
with the systems of imperceptible particles countenanced by micro-theory. 
After having distinguished between structural properties, which are 
unproblematically reducible as a ladder and its constituents (rungs, frame and so 
on), and content properties, a red brick wall every constituent of which ( brick) 
has the property redness, we can say that Sellars’ point is to claim that manifest 
objects cannot be construed as having structural properties. 
However, it seems plausible to say that the first step of Sellars’ account of 
reductionism would be the rejection of the view which considers manifest and 
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scientific images as consistent systems operating at distinct levels of analysis: 
science, according to this thesis, would provide a superior account of the world.  
The American philosopher, distinguishing between ontological and 
methodological arguments, denies that sciences have right to an epistemological 
primacy for the reason that they are dependent upon the framework of common 
sense for observations.86  
Sellars’ acknowledgment of the superiority of the scientific image would depend, 
as it were, only on its greater degree of explanatory coherence a formulation of 
which might be termed, according to Richardson and Muhlenberg, an “inter-
framework decision procedure”: 
 
In crude fashion, that framework which serves to most adequately describe and explain the 
phenomena concerned (i.e., the observable behavior of objects and persons, particularly the 
perceptual functioning of sentient organism) is the framework which must finally be taken the 
measure of what is real.87  
 
Explanatory coherence is a multidimensional maximizing of the integration of 
theoretical principles and  the accuracy of prediction. 
The weak point of Sellars’ position seems to be the lacking of a criterion 
according to which we can judge a framework better than another, since there may 
be many successful ways of describing and explaining the world resting on 
different purposes and ends. 
According to Richardson and Muhlenberg on the other hand, by using the notion 
of alternative modes of reconstruction or revision of conceptual frameworks, we 
could acquire a good criterion for choosing between contrasting alternatives; the 
criterion required would be: given two or more alternative modes of 
reconstruction or revision, that alternative is best which (a) is the simplest and (b) 
maximizes explanatory coherence. 
Sellars seems interested, following Charles Peirce, in an ultimate normal science, 
that is, in a science as it will be in the future when all the facts are in; the 
American philosopher has the expectation that the ultimate scientific image of 
man will be deterministic, even if he recognizes that, in the present state of 
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science, it is not reasonable to held a deterministic position. At any sense, he 
wouldn’t be so happy to abandon his belief in free will with a sense of liberation. 
 
5. The myth of the Given 
By rejecting the framework of traditional empiricism, Sellars don’t stress the fact 
that empirical knowledge has no foundation, since there is some point to the 
picture of human knowledge as resting on a special kind of knowledge (e.g self-
authenticating reports); however, the metaphor of foundation is misleading: 
 
… in that it keeps us from seeing that there is a logical dimension in which other empirical 
propositions rest on observation reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest 
on the former88. 
 
The rationality of empirical knowledge doesn’t depend on the fact that it has a 
foundation, but much more on the fact that it is a self-correcting enterprise, 
questioning any claim, though not all at once. 
Sellars’ most important contribution to the demolition of the myth of the Given 
consists in his rejecting, as for Hegel, the idea of an exogenous Given  and 
claiming that the Given is not something imposed from outside the activity of 
adjusting the system of our beliefs.  
John McDowell underlines this point: 
 
We must think of empirical rationality in a dynamic way, in terms of a continuing adjustment to 
the impact of experience. To reject the idea of an exogenous Given is to follow this prescription in 
part. It is to refuse to conceive experience’s demands on a system of beliefs as imposed from 
outside the activity of adjusting the system, by something constituted independently of the current 
state of the evolving system, or a state into which the system might evolve. The required 
adjustments to the system depend on what we take experience to reveal to us, and we can capture 
that only in terms of the concepts and conceptions that figure in the evolving system. What we 
take experience to tell us is already part of the system, not an external constraint on it89. 
 
To paraphrase what is said above, we can appeal to the idea that conceptual 
capacities are passively operative in experience: a judgment that something is 
yellow is an exercise of spontaneity, although it needs, as any judging, a right 
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contribution of  passive experience. According to McDowell, this would be the 
same as assuming that i.e. concepts of ,say, colors are only minimally integrated 
into the active business of  accomodating one’s thinking to the deliverances of 
experience, even if no color judgment can be uttered unless it fit into some view 
of the world, being equipped with such things as the concept of visible surfaces of 
objects or the concept of suitable conditions for telling what something’s color is 
by looking at it: it is this kind of integration which enables experience to pass a 
scrutiny of its rational credentials. For this reason, concepts like being red and 
looking red are intelligible only on terms of each other as elements in a bundle of 
concepts that must be acquired together; only adopting this approach, we can 
make out that the space of reasons is more extensive than the conceptual realm so 
as to incorporate extraconceptual impingements from the outer world. The idea of 
the Given, according to McDowell, would offer “exculpations” for the outer 
influence of the world, whereas we would need “justifications”: 
 
But it is one thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in 
can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to have a justification. In effect, the 
idea of the given offers exculpations where we wanted justifications90.   
 
To better understand what is above discussed, we could attempt to think about a 
color concept: when this kind of concept is drawn into operation in an experience, 
the content of the latter is shaped by the  conceptual linkages of the former; by 
virtue of this integration in a whole network, the understanding of the experience 
by the subject contains a wider reality, embraceable in thought, than those brought 
out by the very same experience: 
 
Even in the case of colour experience, this integration allows us to understand an experience as 
awareness of something independent of the experience itself: something that is held in place by its 
linkage into the wider reality, so that we can make sense of the thought that it would be so even if 
it were not being experienced to be so.91  
 
What philosophers as Sellars or McDowell see as the greatest contribution of 
Wittgenstein’s thought is the idea that thinking does not stop short of facts; this 
means that the conceptual distinction  inward/outward does not work: 
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What is in question could not be the thinkable world, or, to put it another way, our picture of the 
understanding’s equipment could not be what it needs to be, a picture of a system of concepts and 
conceptions with substantial empirical content, if it were not already part of the picture that the 
system is the medium within which one engages in active thought that is rationally responsive to 
the deliverances of experience.92 
 
We ought to abandon thus the picture according to which there would be an outer 
boundary around the sphere of the conceptual which would impinge inwardly the 
system. 
This rejection is justified by the idea that this kind of boundary crossing would be 
a causal fact and not a rational: the impressions which impinge on our conceptual 
system and keep it in motion are already equipped with conceptual content. 
However, the arguments presented by Sellars’ Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind would not show, according to some scholars, that the Given is simply a 
myth.93 
A good philosophical move then would be to delete the idea of an outer boundary 
without falling into idealism, slighting in this way the independence of reality. 
 
6. Philosophy as a practical enterprise 
According to Sellars, the historical development of philosophy can be considered 
as the periodic formulation of new questions rather than as a series of answers to 
the same problems like  variations on the theme in music. 
Consequently, a philosophical system “dies” when the questions it attempts to 
answer are no longer asked; there is also another conception of philosophy 
according to which philosophy would give obvious answers, once questions are 
properly formulated: 
 
It suggests that the evolution of philosophical thought is accurately conceived neither as a series of 
different answers to the same questions, nor as a series of different sets of questions, but rather as 
the series of approximations by which philosophers move toward the discovery of the very 
questions they have been trying to answer all the time.94 
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A genuine advance of philosophy would consist then in the replacement of a 
confused question by a less confused one; in Sellars’ point of view, a 
philosophical theory can be attacked in two ways: reducing it to absurdity or 
tracing errors back to their roots; he prefers the latter method because it is 
capable of bringing  definitive results, while the former would leave the root 
confusion untouched: 
 
A mistaken theory can be compared to a symptom of a decease. By the use of inadequate 
medicaments one can often ‘cure’ the symptoms while leaving the disease untouched.95 
 
Thence philosophers can be seen to leap from the frying-pan of one absurdity into 
the fire of another one, incapable of breaking into this vicious circle.  
Sellars’ philosophical perspectives are guided by the metaphysical conviction that 
the distinguishing mark of real things is the power to act or be acted upon;96 this 
line of thought leads to a thoroughgoing naturalism that, remaining true to the 
“synoptic view”, acknowledges, for instance the relevance of the mind without 
assigning an ontological status to intentional entities. 
Sellars’ naturalism then is intimately connected with the idea that the aim of 
philosophy is a practical one, a form of know-how whose success is measured by 
the reflective realization of the philosophical paradigm of knowing one’s way 
around. 
In this sense, to be a good philosopher would amount to face the dialectical 
character of philosophy itself, being disposed to put into question even the 
current conceptual framework: philosophy, in this sense, turns out to be not a 
once-and-for-all vision of humanity-in-the-world, since the way we fit into the 
world is not static; consequently, the achievement of a unitary vision of the world  
would resemble a Kantian regulative ideal. 
The task of the philosopher does not consist in giving analysis in the sense of 
definitions for, according to Sellars, the atomistic conception of philosophy, that 
is, the idea that each philosopher fences himself off in his own philosophical 
garden, is an illusion: analysis, nowadays, means more than the clarification of  
the logical structures of a multidimensional discourse: 
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…discourse not longer appears as one plane parallel to another, but as a tangle of intersecting 
dimensions whose relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to non single 
or simple pattern.97 
 
Distinguishing then the “journeyman tactics” from the “grand strategy”, Sellars 
retains that only the latter, if taken by philosophy,  can be directed toward an 
articulated and integrated vision of man-in-the-universe,  that is, toward a 
discourse-about-man-in-all-discourses.   
Modern philosophy shows interest in two conceptions of man-in-the-world, the 
manifest and the scientific, so that it cannot avoid the attempt to see “how they fall 
together in one stereoscopic view”; these two images represent two pictures of the 
same order of complexity which the philosopher ought to fuse into one vision. 
 
 
7. Naturalism 
Sellars’ commitment to naturalism, it has been said,  seems very problematic, 
since he does not support the hard reductionism which in the last decades 
accompanies every naturalistic philosophical project: the kind of naturalism 
supported by the American philosopher can be expressed, according to him, in 
this way: 
 
As for Naturalism. That, too, had negative overtones at home. It was as wishy-washy and 
ambiguous as Pragmatismus. One could believe almost anything about the world and even some 
things about God, and yet be a Naturalist. What was needed was a new, nonreductive materialism. 
My father could call himself a Materialist in all good conscience, for at that time he was about the 
only one in sight. I, however, do no own the term, and I am so surprised by some of the views of 
the new, new Materialists, that until the dust settles, I prefer the term ‘Naturalism’ which, while 
retaining its methodological connotations, has acquired a substantive content, which, if it does not 
entail scientific realism, is at least not incompatible with it .98 
 
To appreciate what Sellars intend by the term “Naturalism”, we have to stress his 
dislike for every form of reductionism: at the end of Philosophy and the Scientific 
Image of Man, Sellars points out that by confronting the manifest image of world 
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with the scientific image, we feel us compelled to choice between the following 
alternatives: 
i) a dualism in which men as scientific objects are contrasted with “minds” 
which are persons’ attributes; 
ii) a monism according to which we must accept the exclusive reality of 
scientific objects; 
iii) a thesis according to which the status of theoretical frameworks is 
“calculational” or “auxiliary” in the sense that they serve or are 
subjected to the primacy of the manifest image. 
Sellars retains that none of these alternatives can be considered satisfactory and, 
believing this, he defends a philosophical approach that can be interpreted as 
nonreductionist; in his point of view, in fact, determinism itself is not among the 
conclusions of scientific inquiry, unless we intend it as part of a conceptual 
framework, i.e., the scientific image of man; following Charles Peirce, he has 
expectation that the ultimate scientific image of man in the world will be 
deterministic, even if he recognizes that, assumed the present state of science, 
contrary expectations can be reasonably held. 
He rejects a Spinozistic view of the relation  between the manifest image and the 
scientific one according to which the first would be false, while the second must 
be maintained; Sellars, as a matter of fact, aims at describing how the two images 
blend together. 
This position falls on in his philosophy of mind in which he, unlike Ryle, treats a 
large part of our mentalistic vocabulary as being explanatory as well as 
descriptive: by uttering the sentence “it is raining”, a man expresses, by way of 
this utterance, not only a proposition about the weather, but also an act of thought; 
moreover, this performed act of thought is normally part of the causal explanation 
of why the man uttered that sentence. 
What said above is part of Sellars’ antireductionist effort not merely to reconcile 
the conceptual framework of persons with the scientific image, but much  more to 
join the former to the latter, enriching the scientific image with the language of 
community and individual intentions and making the world, as conceived by 
scientific theory, the world in which we live, even if the incorporation of the 
former into the latter is, for the present, realized only in imagination. 
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Sellars advocates scientific realism insofar science is the measure of all things, of 
what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not99, but, in doing so, he is careful to 
distinguish between ontological priority (science) and methodological or 
epistemological priority (observational framework of common sense). The 
ontological priority is attributed to science for it would provide us with a greater 
degree of explanatory coherence; put in other words, the framework which more 
adequately describes and explains phenomena, ought to be taken as the measure 
of what is real. 
Once we admit what said above, we are however not committed to reject in 
extenso the common sense framework since a proposition formulated in this 
Weltanschauung cannot be questioned by, for example, an empirical proposition 
pertaining to the scientific domain: a case study that bears out this thesis is the 
claim that the sentence “physical objects have colors” would express an empirical 
proposition which, even if believed by common sense, has been shown by science 
to be false. 
Sellars explicates his ideas as follows: 
 
The idea that physical objects are not coloured can make sense only as the (misleading) expression 
of one aspect of a philosophical critique of the very framework of physical objects located in 
Space and enduring through Time. In short, ‘Physical objects are not really coloured’ makes sense 
only as a clumsy expression of the idea  that there are no such things as the coloured physical 
objects of the common sense world, where this is interpreted, not as an empirical proposition- like 
‘There are non nonhuman featherless bipeds’- within the common sense frame, but as the 
expression of a rejection (in some sense) of this very framework itself, in favor of another built 
around different, if not unrelated, categories.100  
 
If for maximizing “explanatory coherence”, we have to maximize the integration 
of theoretical principles, the accuracy of prediction and the overall scope of the 
theory in question, we arrive at an understanding of this enterprise in the terms of 
a multidimensional task, which is a character shared a lot by Sellars’ analysis of 
the frameworks by which we encounter the world. 
In effect, by reconstructing the two conceptual frameworks analyzed in 
Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind, Sellars makes use of a “principle of 
comprehension”, according to which “nothing in the phenomenal field is to be 
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completely repudiated, but rather relocated, and, hence, in an adequate 
explanation, accounted for”;101 in Sellars’ point of view, we have to accept the 
idea that we must be familiar with the trend of scientific enterprise, for, only in 
doing so, we can appreciate the framework categories of the manifest image of the 
world and the fact that scientific discourse is a continuation of a dimension of 
discourse already embedded in the common sense framework: 
 
…then one would expect there to be a sense in which the scientific picture of the world replaces 
the common sense picture; a sense in which the scientific account of ‘what there is’ supersedes the 
descriptive ontology of everyday life.102  
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